Key takeaways on launch pricing, role of commercial insurance, and real-world evidence, based on payer interviews
Document 9 (国办发〔2026〕9号, “Opinions on Improving the Drug Price Formation Mechanism”), issued by the State Council General Office in April 2026, is China’s latest overhaul of drug pricing policy. Rather than introducing a single new rule, it provides a framework that formalizes and connects mechanisms already taking shape. A June 2026 draft implementing notice has begun to clarify the details of launch pricing, which are incorporated here. Access Infinity has consulted its payer network in China to explore three key elements of the framework and their implications for manufacturers: the new launch pricing mechanism, the growing role of commercial insurance, and the use of real-world evidence (RWE) in price revisions.
Launch pricing: earlier scrutiny, and a shorter window
The June 2026 draft implementing notice groups new drugs into three tiers based on an innovation-value score. Drugs with genuinely new mechanisms or targets can receive up to 60 points (50 for biologics), derivatives or new routes of administration can receive 30 points, and clinical benefit can contribute up to 25 points. CAR-T products automatically qualify for the “new mechanism” category, a favorable provision for cell-therapy manufacturers. Only drugs with genuine first-in-class innovation can exceed 100 points and qualify for free pricing during the self-pay period. Most new drugs are likely to fall within the more constrained 50–100-point tier, where launch prices are determined by comparison with similar existing products. Drugs scoring below 50 points must be priced at parity with existing comparators.
Even top-tier drugs do not have indefinite pricing freedom. Each tier has a limited “price stability period”: 3–6 years for drugs scoring above 100 points, 2–5 years for those scoring 50–100 points, and none for those below 50 points. After this period, manufacturers must submit a price-adjustment plan based on actual sales and value data or face an automatic reduction of at least 25%. The 50–100-point tier faces further restrictions: prices are capped against reference drugs, whose prices may themselves decline. Manufacturers must also disclose costs to NHSA and may receive a public “yellow-label” warning for substantial price gaps versus reference drugs.
For manufacturers, the new mechanism means greater price scrutiny even without NRDL inclusion. Setting a high launch price to allow room for a later “discount” during NRDL negotiations is therefore likely to become less effective: mid-tier (50–100-point) prices are tied to reference drugs, while top-tier (above 100-point) pricing freedom is time-limited. Building a defensible clinical-value case earlier in development will become more important. This includes selecting the hospital that leads pivotal trials, as the draft explicitly prioritizes the views of institutions that conducted the drug’s own clinical research when NHSA reviews a manufacturer’s self-assessed price. For mid-tier drugs whose launch prices have already been constrained by comparators, discounts at subsequent NRDL negotiations are expected to be smaller than they are today.
Note: The draft implementing notice, reported by Latitude Health via Huxiu on June 17, 2026, was circulated for public comment. Its final form and implementation timeline remain unconfirmed.
Commercial insurance: an increasingly important track
Document 9 also encourages commercial insurance to serve as a complementary payer. This approach was already evident in last year’s 19-product “Category C” innovative-drug catalogue and has now been elevated to this year’s government work report. High-priced drugs that do not secure NRDL inclusion through negotiation may first obtain commercial coverage and potentially enter NRDL later if manufacturers reduce their prices.
For manufacturers, this represents a meaningful, though still limited, channel. Of the roughly 19 products admitted to the catalogue last year, most gained traction through city-level “Huiminbao” supplementary schemes rather than mainstream commercial insurance. Nevertheless, inclusion offers tangible benefits, including dual-channel pharmacy access in some provinces and DRG exemptions. Category C inclusion also serves as a public endorsement from NHSA, helping raise the profile of products that otherwise cannot be advertised. It is also increasing pressure on commercial insurers to participate. Manufacturers may be able to capitalize on this momentum: as Category C products gain clinical credibility, insurers that do not engage risk being bypassed and losing relevance. Commercial insurance is not yet a full alternative to NRDL access, but it is becoming a credible pathway in its own right, particularly for high-priced innovative drugs, newer indications not yet reimbursed, and legacy branded products facing pressure from centralized procurement after loss of exclusivity (LoE).
Real-world evidence: a pricing lever, at the cost of transparency
Document 9 also sets out a forward-looking RWE framework to inform price adjustments for drugs already included in NRDL or the Category C list. This introduces an “efficacy risk” dimension alongside an existing mechanism: financial-risk-based repricing at NRDL’s routine two-year renewal, which compares actual sales and insurance-fund spending with volumes committed during negotiation. By contrast, the proposed RWE approach would compare real-world clinical outcomes with the evidence available at the initial negotiation to assess whether a drug’s value had been underestimated or overestimated.
For manufacturers, RWE presents both an opportunity and a risk. On the positive side, it can generate evidence at a comparatively lower cost than a new randomized controlled trial (RCT). A favorable result endorsed by NHSA can also raise a drug’s profile when direct advertising is restricted. However, studies must be conducted through NHSA-designated “credible evaluation institutions” (currently around 79, with expansion through 14 pilot cities). Protocols are agreed in advance, and all results—positive or negative—must be reported to NHSA. Manufacturers bear both the study costs and the risk of unfavorable disclosures. Although NHSA encourages RWE generation, participation remains voluntary. The possibility of negative findings may help explain why only a handful of companies have explored this route so far, rather than making it standard practice.
Summary
Across all three provisions, China’s new drug pricing architecture is less about loosening or tightening prices outright than about clarifying when and how manufacturers must demonstrate value: earlier, at launch; across more channels, with commercial insurance becoming a credible pathway; and on an ongoing basis, through real-world evidence. Pricing and evidence strategy can no longer revolve around a single negotiation. Instead, manufacturers need a multi-stage value narrative, with genuine first-in-class innovation increasingly providing the clearest route to meaningful pricing freedom.
Frequently Asked Questions
China’s new drug pricing framework introduces a more structured, innovation-based approach to launch pricing. Under the proposed system, medicines are assessed across three tiers based on their innovation and clinical value. First-in-class drugs may benefit from greater pricing flexibility, while others face tighter pricing controls based on existing comparators. Manufacturers will need stronger clinical evidence to justify prices at launch.
Commercial health insurance is becoming an increasingly important complement to China’s National Reimbursement Drug List (NRDL). The Category C innovative-drug catalogue creates additional opportunities for high-cost medicines to gain coverage through supplementary insurance schemes. Although commercial insurance is not yet a complete alternative to NRDL reimbursement, it offers manufacturers another potential route to patient access.
China’s evolving drug pricing framework aims to use real-world evidence (RWE) to reassess medicines based on their actual clinical outcomes. RWE could inform future price adjustments for drugs included in the NRDL or Category C catalogue, helping determine whether their demonstrated value matches initial expectations. While participation remains voluntary, manufacturers must consider the costs and disclosure risks of generating this evidence.
About the authors
Isabel Rubio
Isabel is a Partner at Access Infinity and has supported pharma companies in developing their Pricing & Market Access strategy for products across all major therapeutic areas. She’s worked with several orphan drug manufacturers from the earliest stages of drug development through to launch readiness, to ensure the value of their therapies is recognised by payers.
If you have a question or a project in mind, get in touch with Isabel by emailing isabel@accessinfinity.com or via our contact us page.
Dr Ruodan Nan
Ruodan is an Associate Consultant at Access Infinity with over four years of experience in market access and pricing, supporting both qualitative and quantitative projects across therapeutic areas including oncology, immunology, neurology, rare diseases, ophthalmology, and respiratory diseases. She has developed expertise in market access environments across multiple regions, with a special interest in China and Taiwan.
If you have a question or a project in mind, get in touch with Ruodan by emailing ruodan@accessinfinity.com or via our contact us page.